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In his book, l accuse the Press (1992: 189-92), Philip Ochieng argues that
freedom of expression and the freedom of the press are possible only in
situations where as many people as possible in any given society take part in
the création, analysis, synthesis and dissémination of the ideas, especially
through the media. Ochieng, a former éditer of a number of newspapers in
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, continues that it is only when a society reaches
a level of culture, économies, technology, art and intellect to free enough
members of the society from the daily chores of producing'their own subsistence
needs that it can devote efforts to engage in abstract thoughts that have nothing
to do with subsistence production. Until then the production of the material
needs should be the basis and target of all the ideas expressed. It is only then
that Africans can produce sharper ideas and thus guarantee the freedom of
expression itself in the secondary level of law, politics, ideology and human
rights.
Ochieng's comments should be placed against the trend in Africa where
since the 1980s an independent press has mushroomed. According to
Kussendrager and Meulenberg (1996:13-4) this began in Senegal and Benin,
spread throughout the continent and now, they claim, there are independent
newspapers in almost every African country, even if governments in countries
like Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Zambia try to muzzle their journalists by
intimidation or refined legal tactics. As opposed to Ochieng's view, others
claim that the press should not wait for economie wellbeing but must blow the
whistle on violators of human rights, on corruption and on unjust regimes
(KHRC 1997). The Kenyan Union of Journalists and the Kenya Media Institute
concluded on World Press Freedom Day in 1999 that freedom of the press in
Kenya had improved in the past ten years. Yet they accused politicians of
suppressing the press and undermining the 'hard-won gains of the struggle
for democracy and human rights' (Daily Nation 3/5/99).
In the following analysis, an overview will be presented of the Kenyan
media as it stands today. Ownership, policies and the rôle of the media in the
process of democracy building will be looked at. The performance of the press
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during the Kenya 1997 élections in particular will be reviewed in detail. Our
central question will be: How did the watchdogs play their rôle?' We will
examine how the press covered the élections in the framework of the changing
legal and power base of the Kenyan media. For a clear understanding of the
latter, we will start with sketching the Kenyan media landscape as it developed
during this Century.
History and landscape of the Kenyan media until 1992
In 1902 A.M. Jevanjee starled Kenya's first newspaper, the African Standard
(a monthly) in the then British headquarters for East Africa, the town of
Mombasa. Within six years, the embarrassment of critical statements by his
British editor made him seil the paper to the more white settler-friendly
Anderson and Mayer, who changed the name to the East African Standard.
The daily is still alive and is Kenya's second largest selling newspaper (about
55,000 copies) in the hands of influential Kenyans who are close to Kenya
African National Union (KANU), the ruling party. They bought the newspaper
in 1996 from the Lonrho conglomerate.
Kenya's leading newspaper today is the Daily Nation. Starled in 1960 with
the help of 'Reet Street journalists', and fmanced by the Aga Khan', the paper
now leads with 185,000 copies sold everyday. To this group also belongs the
Taifa Leo, a Kiswahili daily started in 1958. The Kenya Times became Kenya's
third largest newspaper (10,000 copies). Started as the Nairobi Times in 1977
as a weekly, it was bought in 1983 by KANU from Hilary Ng'weno. The
Kenya Times Media Trust, the current publisher, also publishes The Herald
pamphlet. The former Nairobi Times owner, Hilary Ng' weno, has been a major
player in the Kenyan media landscape. In 1975 hè founded the Weekly Review.
For a long time, it was Kenya's only weekly magazine addressing economie
and political issues. The magazine stopped appearing in May 1999 due to
financial problems. In the mid-1980s it sold 25,000 copies. In the end, this
had dropped to a meagre 5,000. By the end of 1978, Ng'weno urged Kenya's
newspapers to dispense with foreign ownership as this would limit editors and
reporters in their freedom of speech,and choice for covering local news. How
'journalistic freedom' would be ensured, though, was a question not addressed.
Actually, bef ore 1992, those who dared to air too critical a voice on local
issues were soon silenced. Beyond, a National Council of Churches of Kenya
(NCCK) publication, was banned for exposing fraud in the 1988 élections. lts
editor was jailed for failure to remit returns to the registrar of books and
newspapers. The Financial Review published since the middle of 1986, initially
as a sister publication to Ihe Weekly Review, but later bought by ils managing
editor Peter Kareithi, one of the founders of the Kenya Human Rights
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Commission, was also banned in 1989 after it revealed fraud by powerful
government officials. Kareithi was forced mto exile (KHRC 1997:3). A number
of publications have faced legal suits, confiscation of issues, bans, harassment
or détention of its journalists and editors. These included Target and its
Kiswahili sister Lengo, run in the 1970s by the Anglican Church, notably the
late Bishop Henry Okullu; Jitegemea and The Watchman, Kikuyu Christian
publications; and The Nairobi Law Monthly, starled in 1987 by lawyer and
member of parliament Gitobu Imanyara. His magazine led the fight for multi-
party democracy in 1990. Another one is Society of Pius Nyamora, starled
January 1992. While praised abroad and among human rights, pro-democracy
and press freedom organisations, in a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
interview in Zimbabwe President Moi slated, 'I will say this: if you read The
Nairobi Law Monthly or Society, you will ask yourself what government, even
in Britain itself, would allow such publications lo exist' (The Nairobi Law
Monthly January 1995).
To prevent a similar fate as the papers mentioned above, other media groups
chose the safer option of self-censorship. The early 1980s saw the country
caught in political rivalry that ended in a coup attempt and witnessed a growing
tension between the press and the authorities. Even the mainstream press,
despite ils self-censorship, was at times atlacked by leaders who feil they were
not respected, misreporled or totally ignored. In the latler half of the 1980s,
criticism was mainly targeted al Ihe foreign (mostly British) press allegedly
for misinforming the world about events in Kenya, even leading to the
déportation of a British journalist in December 1988.
The Kenyan broadcasting scène is even less independent. The country's
two broadcasting stations, the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) and
Ihe Kenya Télévision Network (KTN) are owned by the government and KANU
(until 1998) respectively. In February 1989, the Kenya Broadcasting
Corporation Act came into effect, creating a broadcasting authority that replaced
the Voice of Kenya (VoK) which had hilherlo operated under the Kenya
Broadcasting Corporation (Nationalisation) Act of 1967. VoK was a product
of the nationalisation of the colonial Kenya Broadcasting Service (KBS), and
operated as a government départaient under the Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting. The 1989 Act made KBC largely a commercial enterprise but
with certain powers in law derived primarily from its link with the political
establishment. This relationship was illustrated by the opening signal tune for
the station's radio news bulletins, which was an adaptation of KANU Yajenga
Nchi (KANU is building the nation), the party's anthem. This preceded almost
all news bulletins. The content of these programmes underlined the tight
connection between the party and the station. In the pre-1992 days, presidential
events took as much as 15 minutes in a 25-minute bulletin. The clips for the
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presidential news came directly from the State House-based Presidential Press
Unit (these days known as the Presidential Press Service), and Ihe editors at
Broadcasting House were obliged to run it in ils enlirely.2 Aflerwards came a
chronology of ministers' utlerances and a dreary account of routine work by
administration officials.
The second broadcaster and fïrsl private station, the Kenya Télévision
Network (KTN), came into opération only in April 1990. It was launched by
the Kenya Times Media Trust, which had been established in 1987 by KANU
and Robert Maxwell. Yet until now it has not been fully clear who really owned
the Company during mis time.3 KTN was portrayed to be independent but was
obviously sympathetic to the ruling party.
According to David Makali, head of the Nairobi-based Media Institute,
'Libéralisation of the airwaves in Kenya starled when the country's leadership
realised that broadcasting slations were being eslablished in Ihe région to
compete with Radio Uganda and Radio Tanzania' (Media Review May 1999:
13). Télévision is a potentially influential medium especially for most
developing countries where low literacy levels make the broadcast media, and
radio in particular, ralher lhan Ihe press, the most accessible source of
information. Some 80 per cent of the Kenyan population listens to radio
according to a KBC survey. Moreover, it has been estimated that only about 3
per cent of Kenya's 30 million people can afford to buy a newspaper daily,
with the percentage of those who can afford periodicals dwindling even further
(Media Review May 1999:37). During the 1980s a number of radio stations
such as BBC, Radio Cologne, Radio Deutsche Welle, Voice of America, and
nearer home Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam became the respected sources of
news alternatives for a growing number of Kenyan listeners.
The impact of thé 1992 'libéralisation' of the Kenyan média
On the threshold of the return to multi-party politics in 1991,20 publications
stood offîcially banned (KHRC 1997:4). Yet in the run up to thé first multi-
party élections in 1992, Kenya witnessed an unprecedented explosion of press
freedom. A prolifération of opposition magazines and newspapers were
suddenly publishing reports about sensitive issues that were unthinkable only
a year earlier (see Waruru 1996: 26). Politicians almost alone funded a large
number of thé new pamphlets, newspapers and weeklies. When thé novelty of
an open press wore off after the élections, however, sales began to drop. This
same phenomenon could be witnessed during the 1997 élections. Lack of
advertisers and a lost of interest in politics in thé end meant thé disappearance
of most of thèse publications.
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Among the most populär and lasting newspapers, however, is The People.
This weekly tabloid first appeared on 14 February 1993. Initial copies were
confiscated by the police. The magazine is owned by 1992 opposition
presidential contender Kenneth Matiba, a wealthy businessman, who stood
and lost in 1992 and refused to vie for the presidency in 1997, claiming that
the élections were pre-rigged. He called upon voters to burn their voter's cards.
By l December 1998, The People turned itself into a daily newspaper, The
People Daily, a move the owners had been announcing as early as mid-1994.
The daily appearance (an impressive 100,000 copies) will certainly have
worried the ruling party KANU as The People practise investigative journalism
and reveal regularly stories about fraud, corruption and the behind-the-scenes
power struggles at State House. The main question will be whether daily
reporting will allow the paper to keep up this standard. In this line, biweekly,
The Star, became a populär player in the field of 'revealing' stories at the time
of the élections. Said to be a Kibaki-friendly paper, The Star was especially
favoured among the Kikuyu of Central Province where Kibaki comes from.
The Star collapsed when the editor, Magayu Magayu, was accused of stealing
funds and its main financier passed away.
Pamphlets are a new feature on Kenya's press scène. In line with the
London-basedA/nca Confidential, Kenya witnessed the appearance of Kenya
Confidential, a weekly. It is printed on the same kind of paper, has the same
layout, including the pointers on the backside of its eight pages of A4-size. It
présents itself as a 'polhical and economie awareness newsletter'. It is thought
to be financed by people close to the Democratie Party of Mwai Kibaki.4
Another paper in this line is The Dispatch. In its subtitle it calls itself 'The
Conscience of the Nation'. It is published by Seronga Communication Services
and was starled in January 1998. In August 1998 it turned itself from an eight-
paged pamphlet into a 16-page weekly. It now also addresses sports, leisure
and arts. Yet it soon had to return to the eight-page pamphlet outfit.
The most poorly edited of all publications to émerge on the local scène,
according to, among others, the Media Institute, is The Weekly Sun (see for
example, Expression Today, July 1998:8). It is an eight-page pamphlet-like
paper thought to belong to MP and Assistant Minister Gumo, a KANU hawk
of renown.5 A majority of the stories published in The Weekly Sun are baseless
and aimed at maligning certain individuals. Allégations are made that the paper
is not just used to hurt the opposition, but is also instrumental in the infighting
going on within KANU. To make matters more complicated, it also involves
leading Asian businessmen, because some power barons are in discord over
business deals that went sour. At one time, it released two éditions (No. 5 of
18 July and 20 July 1998 respectively) to please both camps (see The Dispatch
27/07/98:16). Dunia and Exposure are a similar kind of tabloid and pamphlet-
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like papers, airing pro-government views. Dunia was started after President
Moi complained that the ruling party did not have a paper like Kenya
Confidential or The Star. By the middle of 1999, some of these pamphlets
were still operative.6
Just bef ore the 1992 élections The Weekly Review got a serious competitor.
In October 1992, the Economie Review appeared on the streets of Nairobi. lts
founding fathers were former Daily Nation business editors Peter Warutere
and Nixon Kariithi. From the start, it dealt with economie as well as political
issues. It addressed Kenyan, African and other international issues. It soon
became a major competitor to the Weekly Review. The Economie Review gained
more popularity when the Weekly Review seemed to have lost its teeth in
addressing issues regarding corruption. Initially, the magazine influenced the
décisions of foreign countries on Kenya, which earned the Weekly Review
constant attacks from government offices (Media Review May 1999:7). By
the late 1980s, however, the Weekly Review had turned itself into KANU's
mouthpiece. It became the eccentric apologist of the system and propagated
profoundly pro-government views.
The much-praised Economie Review magazine, however, disappeared from
the streets shortly after the 1997 élections. In April 1998, it ran into trouble
with the Kenya Revenue Authority, the body in charge of tax collection and at
that time headed by Hilary Ng'weno, which charged the Economie Review a
crushing KshlO million. The paper could not meet its fmancial obligations
such as staff salaries after its accounts were frozen. It was bought by an Asian
businessman linked to thé KANU establishment. He said thé journal was too
political and wanted tqjurn it into a more economic-oriented magazine.
However, thé magazine never re-appeared under the same name. By December
1998 The Analyst rose from the ashes of the Economie Review, i.e., having the
same editor, Macharia Gaitho. It appears monthly, is more business-oriented
and at Ksh 200 a copy is too costly for most Kenyans.
A more critical stand is taken by weekly magazines such as The Post on
Sunday and Finance. The publications have attracted mixed reactions from
média analysts and practitioners. Critics argue that thé publications hâve crossed
thé limits of ethical journalism by Publishing wanton claims without proof.
But many observers approved of their rôle in keeping the government on its
toes and exposing the excesses that thé mainstream conservative média will
not dare touch.
Finance, started in March 1984, is owned by Njehu Gatabaki, a member
of parliament, while The Post appeared only in 1997 after Tony Gachoka broke
away from Finance to start The Post on Sunday? Shortly after thé 1997 élections
were over, these magazines ran into trouble with thé government. In a press




had rejected applications for the registration by three publications, The Star,
The Post on Sunday and Finance. The statement did not give any reasons or
cite the legal basis for rejection other than to quote an entire Act. The following
day, the mainstream press splashed stories with screaming headlines purporting
that the three publications had been banned. The wave of harassment started
at a time when a number of key personalities in power were out of the country.
The three magazines protested and stated that Kenyan law did not give the
Registrar General powers to ban any publication. The Star published as
scheduled on 14 July 1998, simultaneously with a suit filed in the High Court.
The court granted an interim injunction setting aside the registrar's confusing
order until its legality was disposed of. The registrar's action came in the wake
of failure by various litigants to close the publications. Over a dozen libel
suits had been filed against the three magazines and The Star and The Post on
Sunday had been dogged by a myriad court injunctions since its inception in
December 1997.
The Dispatch was spared the ban.8 In its editorial, The Dispatch condemned
the illegitimisation of Kenya Confidential and the banning of Finance, The
Post on Sunday and The Star. It reasoned that in a free market, the simple rule
of demand and supply had shown that the four papers were able to sustain
themselves without advertising. There is simply a need for bold reporting, the
exposition of corruption and hypocrisy among government officials and Kenyan
society at large (The Dispatch 20-26/07/98:2).
Like the press, the broadcasting media also showed a rise in numbers after
the 1991 return to a multi-party political system. However, in February 1995,
Aurélia Brazeal, the American ambassador to Kenya, stated that her country
was in favour of the enactment of a law by the Kenyan parliament freeing the
airwaves bef ore June 1995. However, despite promises to libéralise the
airwaves, the government continued to exercise a monopolistic control over
the broadcast media. This is clear when one analyses the ownership and
programme content of the new channels. For example, KBC started music
channels Metro l (Western music) and Metro East FM (Asian music) for
Nairobi only.
The first commercial entry in the broadcast media was Capital FM, owned
by Magnet Media Service, which broadcasts a menu of almost solely foreign
music within the capital's confines.9 Royal Media Services has been licensed
to run a Nairobi-based radio station called Citizen FM, which went on air by
April 1999, and also first and foremost broadcasts music. A glimpse of freshness
is its current affairs programme Yaliotendeka. With powerful frequencies,
Citizen FM is only second to the KBC in its reach. It is estimated that the
station could reach 70 per cent of Kenya's population (Media Review May
1999). Ownership is once again vested in the hands of ruling party affiliâtes.10
IK-
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The BBC has been licensed to broadcast on an FM frequency throughout
Kenya, but there is no thorough local news content available on this station.
Similar shortcomings are manifest in the area of télévision. KTN is now
owned by The Standard Ltd, which in turn is owned by Mark Too a close ally
of Moi. The deal was signed in December 1997. Again it was not clear who
were the original owners of KTN, yet is thought to include KANU personalities,
including President Moi himself, Nicholas Biwott, and Abraham Kiptanui (see
KHRC 1997:28). KTN is still facing a Ksh 117 million civil suit filed by
founder chairman Jared Kangwana. It lost its star reporter Linus Kakai, who
won the CNN Africa-Journalist-of-the-Year Award in 1998, to the South African
Broadcasting Corporation to become their East African bureau chief (Media
Review May 1991:4).
TV channel Stellavision (STV) owned by Hilary Ng'weno's Stellagraphic
Ltd solely carries foreign material content (e.g soaps such as The Bold and the
Beautiful). It is" the local partner of Sky Télévision of England. In early 1999
the Company entered into a partnership with the Mauritius-based African
Broadcasting Network for a 26 per cent stake and management. That might
save STV falling into the fangs of the well-known 'vendors' from State House
(Media Review May 1999: 7). South Africa's M-Net satellite package is
commercially oriented, carries no local content and is relatively expensive.
On l May 1999 Royal Media Services' Citizen Télévision started, amid
évidence that they were still trying to overcome starters' problems. The station
mainly broadcasts cartoons, old movies and CNN programmes. It is still a far
cry from what its owners promised. Yet, the station has so far not shown itself
supportive of the government or KANU. It seems to bemostly Kikuyu-oriented
and as such the pro-government owners might show their füll agenda, if allowed
to do so, towards the 2002 général élections.
Broadcast companies which have been issued with frequencies but are not
yet on air include Kitambo Communications Ltd. and Cable TV, owned by the
Cable Télévision Network. Nicholas Biwott, the minister for Trade and Tourism,
again, is named as one of the owners. The East African Télévision Network
(EATN) was also allowed a frequency that was, however, withdrawn following
the purchase of a majority share by the Nation Group. The ensuing heated
debate on this withdrawal resulted in the Nation Group being given a télévision
licence in its own right. Still, court battles had to be fought to implement the
licence to its füll potential as the Nation Group licence was restricted to Nairobi
only. By early 1999, there was still a case in court challenging the authorities
for denying a country wide licence. Events so far show that until this move, the
opening up of the airwaves has been an issue of increasing the number of
stations on air under ownership deemed supportive of the ruling party. Those
who are on air are aware of their limits. The government's allergy to criticism
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means that unless laws guaranteeing press freedom are legislated, there will
continue to be adverse court orders issued agamst critical publications.
In addition to growth m the number of publications and broadcast stations,
a qualitative change in content is evident, particularly in the print media. The
existing daily newspapers have become somewhat bolder in their hard news
coverage and editorial news analyses of Kenya's political and economie
environment. Also cartoonists nowadays dare to draw pictures which were
unthinkable a decade ago. During 1997 journalists could be seen arguing with
state security officers during unlicensed reform rallies stating they were simply
domg their job and wanted to continue doing so. However, the Kenyan press
has yet to convince itself that it can truly be free. At KTN, editors are careful
not to overstep the boundaries that KANU expects the station to operate within.
Individual journalists who have broken this code of silence have been ruthlessly
dealt with. So far, several have been sacked for airing items apparently
sympathetic to the opposition.11 This trend of self-censorship is induced by
what the Kenyan Union of Journalists (KUJ) termed a system of reward and
punishment: 'Many editors in the mainstream press own plots and other
proporties as a reward for their favourable coverage of politicians. Corruption
in our newsrooms has reached alarming rates. Media owners who have also
been compromised are another reason newspapers ignore certain news' (KHRC
1997:24).
Another interesting change is the rise of independent content providers
filling the gap left by thé state-controlled Kenya News Agency (KNA). Thèse
content providers include local information and communication businesses
and NGOs such as thé African Women and Child Information Network
(ACWIN), with a focus on gender reporting; IRIS (Interlink Rural Information
Services) which mainly reports on development issues in thé rural areas. Also
the formation of new, local, freedom of expression NGOs, such as thé Media
Institute and thé Network for the Defence of Independent Media in Africa
(NDIMA) testify to thé increased willingness of thé profession to address
state hindrances to journalistic practice by organising, in solidarity, thé légal
defence of journalists facing state charges for merely carrying out their work.
In spite of thèse improvements in press freedom, Kenyan journalists are
still facing government hostility in times of political anxiety. For example, on
18 March 1994 two journalists were charged with subversion for reporting
that nine people were killed and hundreds replaced in ethnie clashes in thé
Molo area. In June 1994 The People newspaper was fined Ksh.1.7 million
after being found guilty of contempt of court. An éditer and reporter were for
some time jailed for failing to apologise and pay fines. That same year thé
Daily Nation complained about political harassment of its Kisumu
correspondent (Media Review May 1999: 124). Also at this time hitting at
foreign journalists, especially Amencans mamly, was intensified once again.
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Apparently, thé increased bravery employed by journalists enraged the ruling
elite and increased in the number of libel suits agamst the media and banning
of journalists from public meetings.
Characteristics and iegal aspects of the Kenyan media
According to the Institute for Economie Affairs (1998: 38-40), the following
are the weaknesses of the Kenyan media:
(a) limited press coverage (lack of correspondents and high levels of illiteracy
among the public);
(b) limited scope of languages (Taifa Leo is the only Kiswahili daily);
(c) limited vanance in the political-economic orientation of the dailies;
(d) limited diversity in broadcasting content (mainly foreign music);
(e) insecure financial position of Kenyan languages papers;
(f) harassment of journalists (especially photographers);
(g) partial libéralisation of the broadcasting sector (KBC is a ruling party
broadcaster);
(h) cumbersome licensing procedures (as many as 39 radio and 103 télévision
and satellite broadcast license applications are pending at the Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting);
(i) lack of diversity of media ownership; and
(j) urban bias in media content
The strengthening of a democratie society is fostered by the existence of
an informed citizenry. The freedoms of expression and information and the
right to communicate Tnust, therefore, underlie all regulatory and policy
proposais for society in genera! and the media in particular.
In 1995 the government mandated a task force on press laws to develop a
new legal and policy regime for all forms of media in line with the government's
expressed commitment to and civil agitation for füll media pluralism. A Press
Council Bill was proposed which provided for thé formation of a council to
oversee the registration of journalists. The Kenya Union of Journalists (KUJ),
among others, criticised another bill drafted by the task force i.e., the Kenya
Media Commission (draft) Bill. This bill provided for the jailing of journalists
who flout a government mandated code of conduct.
Also the recommendation that the president should be the appointing
authority of the proposed Kenya Media Commission was generally objected,
too. It was stated that parliament would be a better body to appoint members
of the commission. The membership of a Media Commission should be from
the major stakeholders in the industry and consist of persons of known ability
and integrity, the Media Owners Association has said (see Daily Nation
27/11/97). The bill was shelved by President Moi after protests by local
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journalists, politicians, NGOs and foreign diplomatic missions. Also, questions
were raised regarding the sincerity of the government as the task force's work
had been pre-empted three times by the Attorney General's office by the latter's
release of the press bills in 1996, the Kenya Communications Bills of 1997
and 1998.
The Institute for Economie Affairs (1998: 42-55) recently called for a
number of legislative repeals, reforms and innovations.
In the short term:
1. The fundamental right to freedoms of expression, information and
communication should be guaranteed constitutionally.
2. Spécifie législation should be enacted to support the freedom of
information, i.e., easier access to public and pnvately held information
deemed to be of public interest.
In the medium term:
1. Establish an independent statutory media council run by elected
représentatives of various stakeholder groups within the media sector to
deal with registration, complaints, and code of conduct.
2. Conduct a review of all content-neutral législation to simplify processes
of establishing and running the print media.
3. Formulate and enact a regulatory framework to ensure the équitable,
efficient and development-oriented allocation and management of
frequencies for bom commercial and non-profit Community broadcasters,
according to plans submitted, to start broadcasting on a short term and
with clear goals which meet national information and communication
needs and ensuring media pluralism.
4. Reform the public radio and television-broadcasting sector to make it
more responsible and accountable to ensure mat the country is reached
with independent news reporting. Independent, community-based,
participatory press and broadcasters need to be created.
5. Reform the Kenya Posts and Télécommunications Act. This act is an
impediment to the objectives laid out above. It grants the minister of
internai security the power to interfère with transmission.
6. Amend the second draft of the proposed Kenya Communications Bill,
1998, to do away with a complicated five-step licensing procedure, lacking
criteria on issuing such licenses and transparency.
7. Establish an independent public broadcasting authority.
8. Review the rôle of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting KBC
should become an independent public broadcaster and the KNA
autonomous, but privatised.
In retrospect, although press freedom has improved, regulatory and policy
efforts on the media in Kenya to date should still be characterised as restrictive:
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witness the foiled Kenya Mass Media Commission Bill, 1995, and the Press
Council of Kenya Bill, 1995.12 Underlying these press bills was the assumption
that more régulation was better than less, to control rather than facilitate the
developing profession and media content. Laws relating to the establishment
of media are multi-fold and pose impediments to potential new owners. Also,
a broad range of laws was applied to control day-to-day management of the
media, e.g. failure to make import duty payments are used to punish publishers.
Even more important are the content-based laws on subversion, treason,
criminal libel and alarming publications and reports. Finally, civil laws, such
as contempt of court, defamation and ordinary libel, are increasingly used to
limit the freedoms of expression and information. Against mis général
background, how did the Kenyan press play its rôle in the 1997 genera!
élections?
Rôle of the media in the process of démocratisation: the
1997 Kenyan élections
Studies of the media in élection coverage have found two patterns of
fundamental importance. Alger (1990) established that journalists covering
élections concern themselves with two distinct élection events: first, they are
concerned with the 'game of strategy'. The second concern of élection
journalists is what could be termed as the 'substance of élections' .
Most journalists covering the 1997 Kenyan élections were more interested
in the 'game of strategy' rather than the 'substance of élections'. They found
the first one to be of greater interest to both editors and the readers because it
concerned itself with élection. It is called 'game of strategy' because, like in
any other game, it has a winner as wel! as a loser. The exciting story of how
the race was taking place and how one contestant was struggling to take over
the leadership from another was always of great interest to Kenyan readers,
viewers and listeners. People enjoy compétition and they take chances in
backing winners or losers. Many journalism scholars have compared élection
compétition with horse racing and the excitement of the two is more or less
the same.
When journalists get carried away with the compétition element of the
élections they tend to forget a much more important aspect of the process
which concerns the 'issues' involved. According to Alger (1990), 70 per cent
of all the news of élections is about the 'game' rather than the 'issues'. The
coverage of at least four élections (1974, 1979, 1983 and 1988) in the country
and the stories which were then used on the front pages of the time were more
or less based on the 'game of strategy' rather than the 'substance of élections' .
In the 1997 élections, however, both these two patterns played an important
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rôle in the coverage of the event bearmg in mind the fact that voters were
more educated and enlightened than at any other time in Kenya's political
history. To examine what the coverage of the élections was like, it is important
to separate the two aspects and look at them in greater details.
The game of strategy
During the 1997 élections journalists in Kenya tended to pay greater attention
to: (a) the candidate's style and (b) the candidate's image. They wrote long
articles about the various styles adapted by candidates to win parliamentary
and civic seats. The styles varied from addressing public rallies to meeting the
voters in various places which included church organised gatherings and even
funeral ceremonies.
Long stories were also written about candidates' images including the
important positions they held in society. By and large the 1997 élections,
whether they were contests between political parties or within political parties,
were normally centred around personalities, and the press, on the basis of
their style and image, highlighted the rivalry between them. When the coverage
was based on the 'game of strategy' alone, however, voters were not given the
opportunity to understand what various candidates had to offer if and when
they ended up as représentatives of the people.
The situation was made worse by the so-called youth wingers of all the
political parties who went round the constituencies advertising the images of
various candidates through songs and sometimes offering bribes. When all
this happened, reporters covering the élections were, more or less, only
concerned with the strategy and logistics of winning élections and so all they
wrote about was what Alger (1990) would call 'appearance and hoopla'. In
other words, the reporters were only concerned about how much popularity
various candidates were garnering as they conducted their campaigns.
Substance of élections
Given the fact that the Kenyan voters who happened to be both regulär
newspaper readers and customary TV viewers or constant radio listeners were
among the elite in our society, the 1997 élections coverage became more
demanding than the provision of stories based on mere 'games of strategy'.
These were the people who wanted to know from the media a little bit of
background information about the candidates such as their qualifications and
their leadership abilities.
Journalists interested in the substance of élections became serious writers
who provided their readers with backgrounders, news analysis and
commentaries about policies of political parties and what was contained in
their manifestes. The 'race horse' drama of who was winning the élections
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and who was losing was brought about in their reports m the form of letting
the people know what they stood to gain or lose by their choice. This kind of
analytical coverage of élections m 1997 tended to be the exception rather than
the rule and was mainly confined to a handful of the up-market media such as
the East African and to a lesser extent the Sunday Nation.
Although not uncharacteristic of other élection writers, what was most
noticeable among Kenyan journalists in 1997 was their préférence to
concentrate on issues concernmg disagreements among the candidates so that
the stories they wrote tended to be rather sensational. This was in keeping
with the journalists' désire to highlight issues concerning conflict as human-
interest stories. Another aspect of concern for reporters interested in the
substance of élections was the candidates' traits and record. In a minority of
cases, serious journalists reviewed all the candidates' past positive and negative
contributions to the society and predicted what was likely to happen when the
electorale gave them positions of responsibihty.
This kind of analysis was not done adequately in the 1997 élections; yet it
was clear that, if used effectively, it could rid Kenya of the culture of electing
candidates whose only qualification was the tribe they belonged to or the
support they got from bigger godfathers. It was the kind of journalism that
would have made sure candidates were elected on merit rather than other
parochial considérations, including membership of a clan or accumulation of
vast wealth. The notion that journalists would always highlight human interest
issues caused by odd incidents was proved right in 1997 élections coverage
when even the most serious among them pegged their otherwise unprejudiced
analysis to petty incidents of conflict, adventure and self interest.
This meant that no matter how much journalists wanted to dweil with the
'substance of élections' in 1997, the factors and orientations of news production
pushed them to see policy statements as quickly losing their 'newsworthiness'
whereas campaign missteps and the bizarre events of the électoral process
were 'fresh occurrences', which adequately answered the journalist news value
requirement of timeliness. Unfortunately, once a candidate made his position
on an issue known,»further statements concerning that issue declined in news
value sensé. Therefore, journalists covering the 1997 élections had to have a
good nose for news to produce a good story after sitting through innumerable
répétitions of speeches by the same people talking about the same issues in
different parts of constituencies.
One area that totally failed in Kenyan journalism during the coverage of
the 1997 élections was the little attempt made by the practitioners to get
exclusive stories from candidates on significant policy issues that would have
led to real assistance to the voters by laying bare at least two aspects of the
candidates:
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(a) Whether they had adequate knowledge about the matters highhghted in
their manifestes; and
(b) Whether their général proposais on such important issues as the country's
budget were actually reasonable and not mère élection wishful thinking.
Despite the fact that Kenya's economie, social, political problems were so
well known, serious journalists did little to pose relevant questions to all the
candidates from all the parties in order to give those candidates an opportunity
to teil the people what actions would be taken to solve these problems once
elected to parliament or to the local authorities. These issues should have been
at the centre of the campaigns with constant efforts to get answers on solutions
from candidates of all parties. What the public got from the media was mostly
the game. Kenyan voters would also have benefited a lot if newspapers had
started a trend of running a special series of articles on the major party
candidates, including synopses of background, éducation, career, qualities as
public figures and a fair amount of material on policy positions. This way, the
media would have played an important rôle in agenda setting.
Patterson's belief that the media could be instrumental in the formation of
images was clearly seen in the coverage of the 1997 élections in Kenya.13 By
writing in-depth profiles of certain well chosen leaders and their tribalistic
power structure, the Kenyan press (Daily Nation, East African Standard and
Kenya Times) and almost all the magazines helped to create favourable images
of the selected politicians who by and large were party leaders. The fact that
many of the party leaders held the top positions in their political organisations,
without even being elected legitimately, did not seem to bother the journalists.
If newspapers succeeded in conveying the fullness of the images of
candidates, télévision made an even more effective attempt in giving the voter
a proper impression about certain favoured candidates' personalities and
leadership capacity. The KANU-controlled TV stations (both KBC and KTN)
selectively covered certain campaign events with the aim of promoting the
political image of President Moi and his closest KANU contestants.
The notion by Arterton14 that interprétations placed upon campaign events
could frequently be more important than the events themselves became true
in the coverage by TV of the 1997 élection campaigns. In other words, the
political contests were shaped primarily by the perceptual environment within
which candidates conducted their campaigns. This was particularly common
in the early nomination stages when perceptions about party leaders outweighed
reality in terms of their political impact.
TV journalists communicated these perceptions to voters and party activists
and their main job was to make the viewers, who were the voters, believe that
campaigns by Moi and his party were succeeding. The perception by TV
journalists put President Moi as the front runner and candidates like Koigi wa
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Wamwere among the last ones. One of the most important interprétations made
by Kenyan journalists dunng campaign time was to predict the winners. In
some developed countries this is done by the use of survey projections.
Compétition between the networks and the use of various survey sampling
techniques have made media men in these countries announce élection winners
well before the polls have closed in some parts of the country.
Dunng the 1997 genera! élections in Kenya, a number of print media and
other institutions tried to conduct some kind of polls. None was actually right,
which meant that the kind of polls they conducted were either faulty or things
changed drastically after their prédictions. The ability to highlight issues and
to force politicians to respond to them is more powerful than trying to predict
the winner or loser of any élection. Journalists could and should challenge
politicians to air their views on foreign policy, housing, health, éducation,
employment, agriculture, environment and the gender issue in an intellectual,
demandingly rigorous format and make them address the topics in a way they
might not in a mere campaign speech.
A number of journalists were trained by one of the authors, among others.
Journalists were advised to make a thorough examination of the constitution
and encourage public debate about its amendments in order to create a
conducive atmosphère that would allow free and fair élections. Reporters in
1997 were, therefore, particularly asked to look for instances where the law
was used during the campaign period to extinguish, suppress or dilute the
individual's free enjoyment of these rights. Four freedoms were particularly
important for the journalists to bear in mind while observing the élections.
These were freedom-of conscience; freedom of expression; freedom of
movement; and freedom of assembly and association. Also journalists were
instructed to critically examine the shape and structure as well as the behaviour
of the électoral commission as the country prepared for the 1997 élections.
According to Torn Maliti, no democratie government in the world would
ever want to go to an élection with the kind of record the Moi administration
had when it was preparing for the 1997 genera! élections.15 Yet, it managed to
remain in power despite claims of rigging and the absence of a leve! playing
field. To what extent, one may ask, did the media in Kenya help educate the
voters on their électoral rights and how far did they succeed in bringing to
light issues that helped the voters cast their votes wisely?
Journalists and constitutional changes
The préparations for the 1997 genera! élections began with a national debate
on the need to change the constitution in order to make future élections in
Kenya free and fair. The debate was initiated by various institutions within the
civil society led by the National Convention Assembly and its executive wing,
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the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC) (see Chapter 2). The
argument put forward by constitutional reformists was that the 1992 élections
were conducted on a playing field which tended to favour President Moi's
ruling party KANU. Without a level playing field, it was argued that the
national élections in 1997 would end up as an exercise in futility that would
only hoodwink the people and deny them their democratie right to elect leaders
and parties of their choice.
If there was any time when Kenyan journalisai neared excellence in its
interprétative présentation of events, then it was in the reporting of the NCEC
demands and the conditions set by the people for constitutional reform. NCEC
représentative Prof. Kibwana's press conferences were not only well attended,
but they were also well covered by both the national and the alternative press.
His own organisation, Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION)
came up with a publication, The Citizen, which set new standards of analy tical
journalism in Kenya. Never before has the work of so few journalists been so
useful in mobilising so many in the struggle for true democracy in Kenya.
Obviously, the proponents of constitutional reform met with vehement
opposition from Moi's government and his party which accused Prof. Kibwana
and his supporters of attempting to grab political power unconstitutionally.
Moi's stand was also backed by his supporters in the media circles who made
futile attempts to dampen NCEC's demands. Despite the suggestions made by
the enlightened members of civil society, President Moi's government took
great advantage of the unchanged constitution to tilt the playing field in favour
of the ruling party long before the date for the new élections was known. In
1996, for example, the KANU-controlled électoral commission started
reviewing constituency boundaries and ended up with creating 22 new ones.
This aspect did not get the kind of publicity NCEC's strike threats captured. It
was obvious that strikes made better headlines as human-interest stories than
constituency boundary changes. Once again journalists abdicated their
watchdog rôle at the altar of headline-catching stories without being guided
by conséquences as an important news value.
As the democratie forces led by NCEC were championing meaningful
constitutional reforms, KANU managed to get some members of parliament
from the opposition to work together with the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group
(IPPG) and produce some changes in the constitution. Since the IPPG had the
blessings of both KANU and President Moi, the KBC gave its délibérations
maximum positive publicity and any suggestions made by the NCEC received
condemnation by both the KBC radio and télévision. When the KANU-IPPG
campaign to popularise the constitutional changes suggested by the group
was in füll swing the attorney genera! published two bills: the Constitution of
Kenya Review Commission Bill and the Kenya Statute Law Repeal and
(Miscellaneous) Amendment Bill.
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The IPPG suggestions, which were eventually adopted by parliament, were
not entirely undemocratic. Certain progressive changes were made by the IPPG
which had also managed to get support of the private national print media
including the Daily Nation and the East African Standard. The IPPG also
managed to get the backing of some powerful international organisations,
including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
Locally, it had the support of the Centre for Governance and Democracy which
produced widely circulated pamphlets telling the voters the advantages of the
changes introduced by the IPPG.
Maybe the greatest achievement of the IPPG proposais was to make it
illégal for all civil servants, including those in provincial administration, to
engage in the functions of any political party. The sub-chiefs, chiefs, district
offïcers, district commissioners and provincial commissioners, who previously
openly campaigned for KANU, were banned by thé new laws from acting as
agents or supporters of any political party which meant that civil servants
were not allowed to express public support for any party or any candidate;
were not allowed to préside over campaigns and other political meetings; were
not allowed to participate in nomination exercises of any political party; and
were also not allowed to give preferential treatment to any candidate, party or
supporters. The new law required that ail candidates should be served equally
and it received massive support of thé média. By 1999, after Président Moi
had directed that thé constitutional review should be brought back to parliament
and away from civil society, the same media showed their hypocritical stand.
For example, thé Daily Nation's columnists stated that 'Moi never had the
intention to hâve thé constitution changed' and, 'Moi ail along intended to
perpetuate his rule beyond 2003' and phrases along those unes. When thé
NCEC uttered thèse words in 1997, thé Daily Nation 'made them véritable
lepers in their own land while preaching the virtues of IPPG, which,... marked
the "dawn of a new era in Kenyan politics", no less.' (Expression Today May-
June 1999: 3).16
The press did not take this criticism seriously when, in November 1999,
the NCEC launched 'A vision for national renewal', a 37-page booklet
containing suggestions to break thé constitutional deadlock by implementing
six steps to démocratie renewal. In thé proposai, it suggested (step 2) the
formation of a transitional caretaker 'government of national unity' of all
stakeholders, including KANU, opposition political parties, religious
organisations, NGOs, thé private sector and the armed forces. At the launching
gathering, attended by one of the authors, the booklet was presented and
discussed. The next day the Daily Nation headline screamed that the NCEC
wanted the military to join a reform government (Daily Nation 05/11/99).
The East African Standard likewise solely focused on the military involvement.
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Also, in their editonals the papers tried to finish the NCEC initiative by
highlightmg only the military inclusion proposai. As a resuit, a bizarre circus
was set in motion by cabinet ministers and MPs from both sides of thé floor
ail hastily seeking thé limehght as they condemned thé NCEC for trying to
repudiate thé legally elected government of Président Moi. They also accused
thé NCEC of forming a parallel government and wanted its officiais to be
charged with treason. At best, the NCEC proposais were naive, dangerous,
unfortunate or impractical (see Daily Nation 06/11/99). The Kenyan press
once again seriously misbehaved and deserved to be accused of misleading
thé public or worse.
The Media Watch project
Throughout the campaign period from about August to December of 1997,
both thé international and Kenyan human rights organisations were keen to
see how thé média could influence thé électoral process. Backed by Article
19, thé Kenya Human Rights Commission produced a spécial publication,
Media Watch, which specifically focused on thé 1997 élections. The project
sought to take advantage of thé pre-election mood and energy to 'invigorate
thé nation with an on-going campaign for a level playing field' (KHRC and
Article 19, 1997).
Although thé publishers of Media Watch were concerned with raising public
awareness to generale national support and activism for constitutional reforms
and to ensure that thé élections took place on a level playing field, the main
objective of thé publication was to monitor the state-owned Kenya Broadcasting
Corporation (KBC) radio and télévision. This was an effort to document and
release timely, accurate, and reliable data together with analysis on thé coverage
of news, commentaries, and press conferences. The data was widely distributed
locally and internationally in monthly reports, with a view to pressurising
KBC to maintain impartial and independent broadcasts.17
Using 15 media monitors who worked in four-hour daily shifts, the project
managed to monitor 16 hours of broadcasts daily from 7 am to 10 pm. The
broadcasts on KBC's radio and télévision covered both thé national service in
Kiswahili and thé English services.
Among the most important observations made at the beginning of
campaigning was the fact that the KANU government wanted to maintain its
monopoly on broadcasts during the crucial period. The team observed that
critical and independent individuals or establishments that had applied for
licences to operate either radio or télévision stations found it difficult to have
their applications reviewed. Secondly, they noted that the government had
used its control by selectively granting to pro-KANU licences but denying
licenses to opposition applicants. Thirdly, even when licences were issued to
I:r
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the opposition, they typically contained restrictions that prohibited the licence
holder covering news.
Given the fact that the majority of Kenyans depended almost entirely on
the KBC, the 1997 élection campaigns started with that corporation as the
most accessible source of information. This meant that whoever controlled
KBC had the unchallenged power to reach the people of Kenya with whatever
message hè wanted. From the very beginning KBC openly supported KANU
andchit at the opposition. If the authorities had good reasons for not licensing
private radio and télévision stations, then the journalists did not provoke the
government enough to reveal that reason. The issuance of broadcasting licences
to private institutions was viewed by journalists as a private campaign by
individual applicants and, therefore, not good enough a subject for a national
debate. Likewise, the KBC monopoly during the 1997 élections was never
discussed by journalists as a national issue.
Despite the IPPG reforms the Media Watch reports of August 1997 indicated
that the KBC coverage of 'meet-the-people' tours was biased in favour of
KANU. Most of the airtime went to presidential ceremonies and KANU events.
The Opposition received 3 per cent and 4 per cent radio and TV news airtime,
respectively, while KANU and presidential public events combined received
91 per cent and 83 per cent, respectively. Also, news commentaries were geared
at endearing KANU and the President to the public. The Media Watch August
report showed that KBC ignored certain stories of critical national importance
while misreporting others. The KBC, for example, made no mention of the
nationwide pro-reform strikes. The independent media did. Thus, on 7 August,
the KBC stated that workers in Nairobi had ignored the strike and that 'most
business premises except banks remained closed' in the city's central areas,
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Figure 9.1: KBC airtime devoted to the president, KANU, the
opposition and other news items
Phases
Source: KHRC & Article 19 (1998)
Phase 1 : The pre-IPPG agreement phase (7 July-29 August)
Phase 2: The IPPG negotiation phase (30 August - 12 September)
Phase 3: The IPPG Implementation phase (13 September - 2 December)
Phase 4: The nomination phase (3-9 December)
Phase 5: The campaign period (10-28 December)
Phase 6: The polling period (29-31 December)
Phase 7: The post-polling period (1 January - 3 February)
*
Figure 9.1 pro vides an overview of thé recorded airtime devoted to thé
président, KANU, the opposition and other news items in seven political phases
related to thé 1997 général élections that Kenya went through. The Media
Watch recording exercise shows that in spite of the IPPG agreement calling
for a balanced and as much as possible impartial coverage of the players in
thé élection period, the KBC continued to bias its reporting to the benefit of
KANU and President Moi. The initial improvements recorded in phase 3 and
continued in phase 4 were soon lost with the onset of the official campaigning
period (phase 5). KBC again acted as a mouth-piece of the ruling party. It tried
to improve its behaviour during the actual polling days (phase 6). According to
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Media Watch this was due the fact that during these days the fate of the élections
was m the hands of the voters. Thus KBC could afford to be completely
impartial, except for some few omissions that would have potentially been
négative for President Moi and the ruling party. But in the post-polling phase
the curve rose again rapidly to its pre-IPPG levels in favour of KANU and
Moi (see KHRC & Article 19 1998:25).
Ethics, accusations, impartiality and corruption in élection journalism
No matter what the critics of President Moi's regime say about the freedom of
expression in Kenya, the 1997 général élection campaign was accompanied
by the émergence of an increasing number of all sorts of political periodicals
airing all manner of political opinions which made Nairobi one of the most
free cities in Africa at least in the print media. However, since 1991 when
Kenya adopted a multi-party political system, the government has had an
inconsistent relationship with the press. Last year, Kenya's rating feil from
'partially free' to 'not free' according to the Freedom House, a New York-
based organisation that évaluâtes social, political, and economie rights in all
countries.
At a conference for African editors in South Africa in May 1996, Dr Doyin
Abiola, managing directer of Concord Press of Nigeria Ltd, stated that a free
press is characterised as the 'last bastion of hope'. Abiola argued that 'it is,
perhaps, more désirable now than ever to have a press with an open agenda,
seeking to do the greatest good for the greatest nurnber; a press that is untiring
in looking for feasible alternatives; a press dedicated to providing a true market
place of ideas To put it another way, a press which is daring enough to be
a people-oriented medium with unalloyed faith in the ordinary people; a press
that is not a cohort with any government or business elite; a press without a
vested interest in the status quo' (Nairobi Law Monthly Nov. 1996: 34-35).
Some questioners have asked whether the press in Kenya is playing this
rôle. For example, Pheroze Nowrojee, a Kenyan lawyer and constitutional
reform activist, accuses the press of helping to distort post-élection reality. By
questioning the steps made in the reform process as it develops in Kenya these
days, steps that upon close scrutiny seem to be directed mainly by a handful
of powerful individuals, hè points out that the press needs to ask itself whether
it is a participant in 'this process of manipulated amnesia and disempowerment?
Is the media a conscious or unconscious vehicle of this forgetting and uncaring
process?' (Expression Today July 1998: 32). Instead, Nowrojee continues,
Kenyans must first look at their problems frankly and openly. We must
harness the real demand for peace we see. But we must also be prepared
to face our real fears. We must examine our ethnie différences and distrust.
. . . We need a Government of National Unity in substance... Those in
power now must resist that temptation to tailor the changes to personal
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benefit. And the media must realize that forgetting all the time amounts in
the end to participating in the distortion of reality?' (Expression Today
July 1998: 32).
If the alternative press in Kenya appeared to be rather weak on thé ethical
requirements of impartiality during thé campaigns, they are even weaker on
the principle of fair play. Hardly ever were readers of the alternative
publications, which made scathing attacks against KANU leaders, given thé
opinion of thé people they pounded upon. Yet professional ethics demand
that that voice should be heard too. Ethically, any accusation made by a
newspaper outside a court of law should have been balanced by opinions of
those being accused. The alternative press in Kenya was füll of serious
accusations of leaders in the government and the ruling party KANU. Very
often the accusations were legitimate since the papers Publishing them were
only playing their watchdog rôle of the Fourth Estate. However, the manner in
which the stories were presented to the people was unprofessional as it failed
to observe the important ethical requirement of fair play. Stories accusing the
government of all manner of things would have sounded more authentic if the
accusations were balanced by comments of the accused, even if that comment
was simply saying 'no comment!'.
It was easy for journalists in the alternative press to be biased during the
élection time, because they rubbed shoulders more often with opinionated
politicians. It was also possible many of them did not even know that being
publicly biased was being unprofessional. The thrill of chasing an exposé on
a major corrupt practice within the government easily blinded them to the fact
that as professionals they had to always make an attempt to see the other side
of the coin.
In Kenya, the survival of the alternative press during the 1997 genera!
élections appeared to depend heavily on exposés obtained from freelance
writers who were not necessarily reliable news gatherers. Numerous were the
times when the use of stories from such reporters landed an editor in serious
legal problems, yet when all is said and done it was only natural for the
independent newspapers to have a professionally healthy hunger for exposés.
That hunger was always nurtured by the use of stories which did not withstand
the scrutiny of editors in search of authenticity.
A close examination of the Kenyan press (both mainstream and the
alternative) during the 1997 général élections revealed that falsehoods could
and did slip through editors' fïngers, thus making it difficult to erect an airtight
defence against lying reporters. The need for editors to check and check all
the facts before they published them seemed to have been considerably relaxed
during the 1997 campaign.
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Both the alternative and the mainstream press in Kenya had little problem
with decency which is an important pillar of journalistic ethics. Indecent
présentation of stories of prudent nature exposing extramarital activities of
certain candidates was used in Kenya during the 1992 général élections. In an
infamous daily pull-out in thé Kenya Times known as KANU Briefs, pseudo
journalists produced stories hitting below the belt against opposition candidates.
The practice of writing indécent articles against candidates did not show its
ugly head so much in thé 1997 général élections.
Although journalism in Kenya is among the most admirable in Africa, it
faced a serious problem of inaccurate reporting during thé 1997 général
élections. Accuracy became a major professional concern among editors during
thé campaign period owing to thé short supply of reliable news and sources
even among officiai circles. Yet, a lot of what was published in Kenyan
newspapers at the time was second-hand information. MacDougall (1968)
admits that most news gathered by reporters is second-hand, but warns
journalists to remember that news sources are unquestionably responsible for
as many if not more news story errors than reporters. He even suggests that
mistakes made by those giving out news may be intentional.
The reporters' weapons against inaccuracy, as a resuit of news sources'
inability or unwillingness to give reliable information, are vérification and
honesty of purpose. If a reporter approaches thé task of both reporting and
writing his story without préjudice, whatever error hè makes at least will be
unintentional. Fairness and caution both require that when two persons
interviewed differ greatly as to thé truth, the statement of both should be
included in thé news-story. However, Kenyan journalists trying to reach
accuracy during thé 1997 campaign were often dealing with people capable
of making public statements and totally denying ever making them when they
were in political or légal hot soup the next day.
A good example came from thé then FORD-Asili chairman Kenneth Matiba
who told journalists that hè had resigned his Kiharu parliamentary seat and
promised to communicate his résignation to thé speaker of the National
Assembly thé next day (East African Standard 31/05/97). But thé next day
Matiba disowned the story scapegoating thé journalists who had written it.
Reporters in Kenya had to be extra careful because they were not only dealing
with inaccurate, misleading and sometimes outright lying sources of
information but with extremely ruthless laws that dealt cruelly with journalists
who published falsehoods. The only answer for the true professionals was to
be truly responsible journalists ready to publish thé truth and be damned for
it. This leads to the next most important pillar of journalistic ethics:
responsibility.
Whenever thé Kenyan despotic leaders talk about 'responsible'journalism
or press they mean thé journalism and press they hâve in their pockets and,
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therefore, under their total control. Their repeated calls for 'responsible
journalism' are usually louder at élection time and the 1997 period was no
exception. A number of newspapers, magazines and all the radio and télévision
stations in Kenya are usually systematically manipulated by various interested
parties to influence voters' opinion during élection time. A good number of
them were subjected to mat predicament during the 1997 élections. Little did
some of the editors concerned seem to realise that they were actually being
used to perpetuate the misrule of dictatorship. Journalism scholars feit that
Kenyan practitioners had, therefore, a much harder obligation of upholding
journalistic principles of responsibility at the risk of not only being labelled
traitors by the dictators but of endangering their jobs and, in some cases, even
their lives during the 1997 élection time.
One famous Kenyan journalist, Kwendo Opanga, a former political
commentator of the Sunday Nation, in his column 'The week that was' of 28
September 1996 wrote: 'Kenya's newspeople now have to décide whether
they will be society's headlamps or its mirror. . . If newspeople want to be
mirrors of society, they will be corrupt. If, however, they wantto be headlamps,
then they must shun corruption.' In July 1998 Opanga resigned from the
Daily Nation after allégations were made by the Kenya Times and The Weekly
Sun of him taking bribes from KANU in 1992. Apparently, the action against
Opanga was started after hè suggested in a recent commentary that Kipruto
arap Kirwa, a junior in the KANU ranks, was more competent than Moi.
Opanga admitted hè had worked for KANU as a consultant. He was under
pressure to help the party and made the mistake of attending some meetings
of a KANU 'Think Tank' and accepting some money offered before quitting
the job. Opanga later on became managing editor of the Sunday Standard in
December 1998. KANU had successfully forfeited a populär journalist known
and trusted by the ordinary Kenyans for his independent opinions and for
making critical remarks towards the ruling party and the Kenyan government.
George Krimsky in Finance, 9 August 1998, questioned the relevance of
all this to the emerging democracies around the world. Certainly, the Western
expérience, for all its messiness, provides a useful precedent, if not always a
model. For example, when one talks about an independent media, it is necessary
to include financial independence as a prerequisite, in addition to political
independence. The Western revenue-earning model of heavy reliance on
advertising is highly suspect in many former Communist countries but one
has to weigh thé alternatives. Are government and party subsidies less
imprisoning? If journalists are fearful of contamination by advertisers' pressure,
they can build internai walls between news and business functions, similar to
those that Western newspapers erected earlier in this Century. If they are fearful
of political contamination of thé information gathering process, they can build
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another wall separating thé newsroom from thé editorial department - another
important concept in modem Western journalism. The problem in many new
democracies is that journalists who once had to toe the single-party line equate
independence with opposition. Because they speak out against the government,
they say they are independent. But haven't they just traded one affiliation for
another?
There is little room for unvarnished truth in a partisan press. Is objectivity
a luxury in societies that have only recently begun to enjoy the freedom to
voice their opinions? The watchdog rôle of the press can only appear as mean-
spirited. How do the government and public protect themselves from its
excesses? In the West, it is done in a variety of ways. One, for example, is the
use of the 'ombudsman'. In this case, news organisations employ an in-house
critic to hear public complaints and either publish or broadcast their judgements.
Another one is the création of citizens' councils, which sit to hear public
complaints about the press and then issue verdicts which, although not carrying
the force of law, are aired widely. Last, and most effective, is libel law.
There is still a need today, perhaps more than ever, for distinguishing sense
from nonsense, for sifting the important from the trivial and, yes, for telling
the truth. Those goals still constitute the best mandate for a free press in a
democracy. Kenya still has a long way to go in both respects. It will be a road
with ups and downs as the Kenya Union of Journalists observed recently.
When the élections were over, a rise in cases of open violence against journalists
by state agents and gangs on the payroll of powerful individuals was witnessed.
For example, in July 1998 Patrick Mayayo, a Daily Nation reporter, broke a
story on kickbacks in the customs department that led to the arrest of high-
ranking officials. He later on received threats and was followed. On
8 November 1998 Bernard Liru, a correspondent with the East African
Standard, died from injuries sustained in a suspicious automobile crash after
hè published a report on graft and malfeasance involving the Mumias Sugar
Company. On 15 February 1999, Expression Today executive editor David
Makali was seized at the Stanley Hotel in Nairobi by a gang of 12 unidentified
men who beat and tortured him before abandoning him in Karura forest in
Nairobi's outskirts. Makali had shortly before published a report in the
February issue which gave details of the involvement of prominent politicians
and businessmen in a major drug network in Kenya.
Attacking journalists is one way to silence the press, but more effective is
the winding up of the hardware, i.e., the printing industry. The setting ablaze
of printing press and magazine offices are part of the intimidation of press
freedom in Kenya. For example, on 28 April 1995 a police squad disabled
Colourprint Ltd, which prints Finance magazine and The People, and arrested
its director (Media Review May 1999:125). Once again, on 4 May 1998,
Colourprint Ltd was attacked by a gang of seven arsonists who destroyed
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property worth over Ksh. 20 million. Another premise of the Company had
been attacked shortly bef ore the général élections. The Company also prints
leaflets, posters and magazines that the government views with suspicion (see
Daily Nation 05/05/98). Finally, there is a need to address informai repression
within the media, in the form of proprietorial interférence, corruption and a
deteriorating working environment for journalists (see Daily Nation
03/05/99). For this reason the press should by all means try to overcome the
obstacles mentioned by Philip Ochieng. Kenya's reality does not allow the
postponement of a high standard press until material wellbeing has been
uplifted.
Conclusion
A close look at how journalists performed their duty during the 1997 élections
reveals many ethical and professional transgressions which were not only
confined to the largely inexperienced alternative press, but also the
accomplished mainstream press in Kenya. There was considérable évidence
that in the 1997 Kenyan élections, editors and media proprietors determined
the important issues that formulated the main agenda of the polls namely ethnie
loyalty. In other words, the media did set some form of agenda in Kenya
before, during and after the élections. Whether the media were distinctly
professional in selecting the national topic to highlight is another matter
altogether. Their Fourth Estate rôle was obviously minimised by their parochial
approach to issues. It is also obvious that during the 1997 élections journalists
in Kenya faced a professional problem, which was developing into an art form:
the perennial dilemma over getting too close to the people in politics who
made news. When too close a relationship was struck up between the two
parties it became rather difficult to play the Fourth Estate rôle.
The other lesson learnt from the coverage of the 1997 élections was the
fact that whenever a journalist succumbed to tribal loyalty, life became „t
extremely difficult for the legitimate seekers of truth. The upkeep of
professional ethics for journalists was essential if they were to embark on the
road to real democracy; but to do so more effectively would have entailed a
greater concern with what was happening in their own back yard where bribes
exchanged hands with impunity.
With corruption in journalism swept under the carpet, exposure of other
forms of dishonesty within society during the élections had to be done with
considérable care lest it boomeranged. Maybe the most important lesson learned
during the 1997 élections was the importance of journalists getting involved
in unearthing the truth about candidates and their parties, their policies and
capabilities, right from the very beginning of the électoral process for the
délectation, or otherwise, of the voter. It was important for journalists to réalise
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that the battle ground m the électoral exercise was not only between parties
but also within the pardes themselves.
Out of the 1997 élections came thé réalisation that the rôle played by the
watchdogs of the watchdogs contributed to the adhérence to professionalism
in at least as far as the print media was concerned. When they knew their work
was being closely scrutinised by experts, journalists always performed better
even though that made the undertaking akin to walking on eggshells for fear
of earning the wrath of the likes of KHRC and the Article 19 Media Watch
project. This exercise showed clearly the partiality of the Kenya Broadcast
Corporation during the 1997 élections in Kenya. These organisations should
alsö play their part in the much needed reform of the media landscape in
Kenya.
The rôle of the press in the coverage of free and fair élections required
journalists to be courageous enough to exposé evils, which probably made
those journalists populär with the entire Community. Internai despotism in
political parties, for example, was populär with tribalists, but in some
journalistic quarters it aroused dismay and the writers, few as they were, openly
emerged as principal spokesmen and women for the dismayed.
For a long time journalists believed that no one else should examine thé
manner in which they observed their own ethics. Many believed that rules
restricting their behaviour as journalists amounted to control. They thought
thé non-existence of such rules was good and even noble in its goals. After
seeing how some of them violated their own ethics in thé 1997 élection
coverage, many would agrée that there was a need to expose corruption within
thé profession. Non-existence of any guidelines for writers may be good for
them, but what is good for Kenyan journalists during élections might turn out
to be disastrous for the readers and voters. Hence, another lesson learnt is the
need for strict methods to ensure journalists would be ethically upright
throughout campaign periods.
It must be accepted that during thé 1997 élections there were many editors
in the country who operated in newsrooms as political commissars for various
parties or tribal unions. Their biased présentation of news made the readers'
trust in their credibility badly shattered. Looked at in this manner, the 1997
élections made many journalists lose their credibility as people's watchdogs
and, for them to regain public trust, they must in future prove to be morally
and professionally more upright than thé politicians. That way their credentials
as people's watchdogs and occupants of the Fourth Estate will always be
reassured.
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Notes
1. The Aga Khan is the mherited title of the leader of the Shnte sect of the Ismaih
Muslims who can be found mamly in Pakistan, India, Yemen, Iran and Eastern
Africa. The current Aga Khan IV was born in 1936 in Geneva. His real name is
Karim Al Hussaini Shah. He inherited the title from his grandfather and was educated
in Switzerland and at Harvard University.
2. Very often regulär programmes were postponed to allow live telecasts of the president
at the Nairobi International Show or at the University of Nairobi graduation ceremony.
Few things epitomised the folly of the préoccupation with the person, rather than the
event, as the determinant of an item's value than KBC's treatment of Nelson Mandela's
release from prison. The world had waited with bated breath for days on end to see how
Mandela would look after 27 years behind bars, years when no photographs of the man
had been seen by the outside world. So what was KBC TV's lead item in their news
bulletin that day? President Moi at church, the perennial opening item, with nothing
more happening than the singing of hymns and the sermon from a regulär preacher.
And that historie moment of Mandela walking out of prison was delayed in Kenya for
10 minutes (KHRC and Article 19 1998:15)
3. Among the previous directors of KTN were Mwakai Sio, who was also chairman of
Transnational Bank, Wilson Kibet (also chairman of Kenya Times), Philip Murgor (former
KTN chairman), Sham Solei (deputy général manager of Transnational Bank) and Charles
Field-Marsham (son-in-law of Cabinet Minister Nicholas Biwott). In 1993 Minister
Kamotho said it was owned by KANU. At the time Jared Kangwana, initial investor in
KTN, one-time chairman of Transnational Bank and Kenya Times Media Trust, and
owner of The Mall, a shopping centre in Nairobi's Westlands suburb, was removed
from the station. By early 1996 Kangwana filed a case against KTN claiming Ksh. 212
million. Sidney Quantai appointed KTN's editor-in-chief, later fired for reporting on
issues not welcomed by KANU, at one time stated it was private individuals owning
KTN. The Stör also concludes its investigations that KANU never owned KTN (see The
Star 12-15/12/97:20)
4. The late David Munene Kairu, a close fnend to Mwai Kibaki, who passed away soon
after winning the élections forparliament in Kieni constituency, is said to be the financier
of both Kenya Confidential and The Star.
5. The international observers indicated that according to their observations, Gumo is
believed to have fraudulently acquired his seat in parliament for the Westlands
consütuency in the Kenya 1997 élections (see also Chapter 14). The Weekly Sun is
published by Scallatti Communications Services in Mombasa.
6. It is believed that the power struggle over the vice-presidency was the main reason why
politicians continuée! to support some of the pamphlets. These publications have
increased in number with a new one called The Weekly Citizen coming out regularly
and always supporting Simeon Nyachae, the ex-minister for Finance, who resigned
from the government in March 1999 after being demoted to the Ministry of Trade and
Industry. The other new pamphlet-like publication is The Metropolitan, which campaigned
(unsuccessfully) against the appointaient of Prof. George Saitoti as the new vice-président.
The paper is generally against the Kikuyu and appears to support Musalia Mudavadi.
Minister Kalonzo Musyoka, another potential candidate, is said to be linked to The
Kenyan magazine that stopped appearing after only four issues when Musyoka's bid for
the VP post seemed without hope after the reappointment of Saitoti (Media Review May
1999:6). There is a big racket concerning the publications of the pamphlets. Journalists
producing them are hterally for sale and can be bought by individual politicians to attack
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their enemies in the most dangerous manner without caring about the truth,
professional ethics or laws of libel.
7 The example of Gachoka is mteresting in that it shows the interconnections between
media, business, politics and harassment rather clearly. The Gachoka family owns a
110-acre farm in Thika. While Tony Gachoka was having a fight with an influential
billionaire banker the farm was unprocedurally transferred in broad daylight and yet
neither the Minstry of Lands nor the police could unearth the truth. Tony Gachoka went
to see President Moi to solve the problem and this enraged Gatabaki, his former employer
at Finance (see Daily Nation 14/12/97). Rumours are that one of the financiers of The
Post on Sunday is one of the five sons of Moi who wants to politically kill his brother
Gideon Moi.
8. Some speculated that the four publications were banned because of propagating a tribal
agenda (i.e., in favour of the Kikuyu Community), whereas The Dispatch is not. This
does not mean that The Dispatch is free from harassment. On 21 April 1998, The Dispatch
editor Maneno Mwikwabe was charged with 'publishing an alarming report' after hè
published a report about a mysterieus disease outbreak and 'restlessness' in the army
following reports of a government plan to stage manage a coup (see Expression Today
July 1998: 34). Also people claiming to be policemen were confiscating The Dispatch
while others resold the copies to the vendors at Ksh. 5 each). According to the editor,
this was worse than banning since it was costing the Investors in The Dispatch money in
production and salaries while earnings were taken by thugs (see The Dispatch
27/07/98-2).
9. Magnet Media Services received its licence a month before it was incorporated as a
Company. Mark Too, a key Moi ally, belongs to the group of owners.
10. The case of Royal Media Services is instructive. Royal Media first applied for a licence
for radio and TV in 1992. lts propnetor, S.K. Macharia, was then regarded as an
opposition sympathiser and an opponent of the government, having pleaded many cases
against the state on business related matters. When the Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting did mot respond to Royal Media's application in a reasonable time,
Macharia went to court seeking to force the government to make a décision. At one
time hè even sought Minister Makau to be sent to jail for contempt of court. In
1996, Macharia re-emerged in public life as the chairman of a shadowy group of
Kikuyu elite, senior civil servants, and businessmen who were organising stratégies
of luring the Kikuyu people to KANU under the patronage of Education Minister
Joseph Kamotho. As chairman of this group, which is now known as the Central
Province Development Support Group (CPDSG), Macharia has taken a high profile
convening of meetings supporters and fund-raisers for KANU. On 29 April 1997,
minister Makau announced that Royal Media Services had been granted a licence
to operate a radio and télévision station (KHRC 1997:27).
11. For instance, Rose Lukalo was fired after airing the launch of the Democratie Party in
1992. Vitalis Musebe and Isaiya Kabira, head of news and deputy head of news
respectively were suspended for covering the 7 July 1997 mdiscriminate police brutality in
Nairobi and other parts of the country. The two were accusedof giving the government bad
Publicity. Before they were suspended they were grilled at State House, at a meeting
attended by ministers Saitoti and Kamotho among others (Daily Nation 10/07/97 ; KHRC
1997:24).
12. In January 1996, news about the two proposed media bills leaked out. The bills sought
to restrict the practice of joumalism through requirements that Journalists be licensed
and have formal training in journalism to qualify for the licence. They established
mechanisms for registration and de-registration of newspapers by government appointées
without recourse to an appellate authority in case of de-registration. After fierce
opposition, they were hastily shelved by the Attorney General.
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13 Thomas E. Patterson is a professor of Political Science at Syracuse University and in
his The Mass Media Election (New York. Praeger, 1980) hè talks about creating winner
and loser images, something which actually happened in Kenya's 1997 général élections
14 F. Christopher Arterton has served as a policy maker for various American candidates
and is the author of Race for the Presidency. The Media and the Nomination Process
edited by James David Barber Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice -Hall, 1978).
15. In an article published in the December/January doublé issue of Executive Magazine,
journalist Maliti suggested Moi's administration was seeking the people's mandate to
remain in power when it had the worst record of economie mismanagement and political
unpopulär! ty.
16. In mid-1999, after a one-year stalemate in the constitutional review process, Expression
Today (May-June 1999:1) admitted that the 'independent' press had failed in providing
information on the constitutional review process to the public. 'Our failing in this
particular duty was illustrated by a recent proposai by President Moi that the entire
constitutional review be left to parliament. In its skewed view of objectivity the Press
simply reported the proposai as it was, without making any intellectual response to it in
the reports.'
17. The joint effort between the KHRC and Article 19 monitored and documented KBC
coverage of news, news commentaries, documentaries and press conferences for about
nine months leading up to the 1997 général élection. The initiative successfully assessed
the impartiality and independence of KBC coverage of various political parties.
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